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BEFORE TH E
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
Washington, D. C., March 22, 1918
IN T H E  M A T T E R  OF TH E  
INQUIRY TO 
DETERMINE PRICES 
FOR
NEWSPRINT PAPER
PRICE, WATERHOUSE & CO.- 
N E W  Y O R K
BEFORE THE 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
Washington, D. C, March 22, 1918 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
INQUIRY TO 
DETERMINE PRICES 
FOR 
NEWSPRINT PAPER 
PRICE, WATERHOUSE & CO. 
NEW YORK 
TESTIMONY BEFORE T H E FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION TO DETERMINE T H E MAXIMUM 
SELLING PRICE OF NEWSPRINT PAPER 
THE ANNEXED TESTIMONY was given before the Fed-
eral Trade Commission in a proceeding to determine the 
maximum selling price of newsprint paper, pursuant to an agree-
ment which provided for the determination of the price by the 
Commission subject to a right of appeal to the Circuit Judges 
of the United States for the Second Circuit. 
The Federal Trade Commission made no express findings on 
the questions covered by the testimony, and fixed a price on news-
print paper in carload lots of $3.10 per hundred pounds. Upon 
appeal the Circuit Judges fixed the maximum selling price at 
$3.50 per hundred pounds and in doing so made the following 
specific findings: 
In valuing the capital investment used in producing 
newsprint, prices before the present European War 
should be adopted. 
In ascertaining capital investment, i.e., the present value 
of property actually used in paper production, we 
exclude timber lands whether owned or leased, also 
undeveloped or potential water power, i.e., water 
rights; but include mill and town sites, terminal 
facilities, and improvements on or development of 
natural water powers, together with any investment 
by way of actual payment for power rights. The 
foregoing allowed elements of capital value are the 
"tangibles." 
A fair maximum return on said capital in a business of 
the hazards proven is 15% per annum. 
The Judges found the depreciated present value of "tangibles" 
at pre-war prices to be $25,000 per ton of daily capacity and add-
ing 10% for going value and $12,000 per ton for working cap-
ital arrived at an investment of $39,500 per ton. They applied 
their findings to a plant having a daily capacity of 100 tons as 
follows: 
The capital invested is 39,500 X 100 = $3,950,000 
The fair annual return, 15% = 592,500 
To be obtained by selling all of an an-
nual production of 30,000 tons, or a 
profit per ton of 1975 
1 
The testimony as printed in the record has been revised only 
to the extent of correcting a few obvious clerical errors in 
reporting. 
G. O. MAY 
RECALLED AS A WITNESS, HAVING BEEN PREVIOUSLY 
SWORN, TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
Mr. Wise. Mr. May, how old are you? 
Mr. May. Forty-two. 
Mr. Wise. What is your occupation? 
Mr. May. I am an accountant. 
Mr. Wise. And how long have you been in the business of 
accountancy ? 
Mr. May. Well, including my apprenticeship, it is, let us say, 
26 years, 5 years apprenticeship. 
Mr. Wise. Where did you take your apprenticeship? 
Mr. May. I took my apprenticeship in England in the country 
and then went to the office of Price Waterhouse & Company in 
London. 
Mr. Wise. In England as a prerequisite to admission to your 
practice of accountancy there is a necessity for this apprentice-
ship ? 
Mr. May. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Wise. You were with Price Waterhouse & Company some 
twenty odd years altogether? 
Mr. May. Yes. 
Mr. Wise. And you have been in the accounting business ever 
since ? 
Mr. May. Yes, I have been in Price Waterhouse & Company 
ever since. 
Mr. Wise. How long have you been in this country? 
Mr. May. A little over twenty years. 
Mr. Wise. Always with Price Waterhouse & Company? 
Mr. May. Yes. 
Mr. Wise. Are you head of the firm now ? 
Mr. May. Yes. 
Mr. Wise. Do you hold any positions now? 
Mr. May. How do you mean? 
Mr. Wise. For instance, in connection with the American In-
stitute of Accountants ? 
Mr. May. Yes, I am Vice-President. 
Mr. Wise. And you are, I believe, occupying some position 
with the Government at the present time? 
Mr. May. Yes, I am a Treasury volunteer. 
Mr. Wise. You are working for the Treasury Department? 
Mr. May. Yes. 
Mr. Wise. In the course of your work in accountancy, what 
has been the nature of the work you have had occasion to do ? 
Mr. May. Well, our practice is a very general practice. We 
have touched almost every line of work. 2 
Mr. Wise. Have you worked for the National Government? 
Mr. May. Yes, with the Postoffice Department, and have 
done various other things for the Government. 
Mr. Wise. Have you worked for any of the State govern-
ments ? 
Mr. May. Yes, for several of the State governments, and 
cities. 
Mr. Wise. Municipal governments? 
Mr. May. Yes. 
Mr. Wise. Have you had occasion to audit any of the ac-
counts of the railroads of this country? 
Mr. May. Well, I think, as a matter of fact, since I have been 
with the firm we have audited the accounts of about 35 or 40 
per cent. of the railroad mileage of the North American Conti-
nent. 
Mr. Wise. That includes the Dominion of Canada, the United 
States and Mexico? 
Mr. May. Yes. 
Mr. Wise. And what has been the extent of your experience 
in the industrial world ? 
Mr. May. Of course, that is the big thing of our practice. We 
are auditors of a lot of large corporations, like the United States 
Steel Corporation, but the great bulk of our business is with 
small manufacturing enterprises. That constitutes, the small 
manufacturers, as much as 40 or 50 per cent. of the total. 
Mr. Wise. In your work as accountants do you have occasion 
to be consulted on the question of value of properties ? 
Mr. May. Well, we do not go into the field of valuation of 
properties, but we have a great deal to do with questions of value 
as affected by earning capacity. 
Mr. Wise. Yes, and with earnings? 
Mr. May. And with earnings. 
Mr. Wise. Upon the value of the property? 
Mr. May. Yes. We have acted for a great many people con-
templating purchasing a business or selling a business, and they 
have frequently called on us for advice as to the wisdom of buy-
ing or selling property. 
Mr. Wise. As a preliminary to that advice, I take it, you have 
to make an examination of the books of the properties to deter-
mine what is shown on those books ? 
Mr. May. Yes. 
Mr. Wise. And in this work have you made a study of the 
question of the rate of return on invested capital ? 
Mr. May. The question of return on invested capital is a sub-
ject that I have given a great deal of consideration to for the last 
fifteen years. 
Mr. Wise. As to industrial businesses? 
Mr. May. Yes. Perhaps I may explain that I approached the 
question from an entirely different angle from Mr. Erickson. 
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I do not claim to have made an exhaustive study of the under-
lying theories that he has. My ideas are based on practical 
experience, and I came in from the standpoint, not originally, of 
rate cases or price fixing, but from an entirely different angle. 
Up to about ten years ago I do not think my firm were ever 
engaged in a rate or price-fixing matter, and since then I do not 
think we have been engaged in more than one or, perhaps, two a 
year, and my interest in the matter has developed originally from 
the fact that there was a tendency to value assets, particularly 
mining properties, on the basis of estimating the future earnings 
and then discounting those values at a given rate of interest. 
Now, we have always been advocates of conservatism in ac-
counting and finance and were satisfied that people were using too 
low rates of return in those calculations, and, unfortunately, 
some of the States were supporting them—entirely for tax pur-
poses—one of the most extreme cases being Minnesota which 
valued on the basis of estimating the future return, and dis-
counting it at 4 per cent. I was convinced you could never get 
people to put money into any business of that kind on a 4 per 
cent. basis, I was originally interested in that subject largely for 
the purpose of convincing our clients it was not wise to establish 
any such theories, and later I became convinced that the same 
fallacy was being adopted in the regulation of rates, and I felt 
sure that the Commissions in fixing too low rates were flying in 
the face of an economic fact and going to do more harm in the 
long run to the public than to the railroads, and that is how I 
became interested in value—from this angle. 
Mr. Wise. Now, in the past you have had occasion, I take it, 
to audit the books of a good many of the news print manufactur-
ing concerns in this country ? 
Mr. May. Yes, we have done quite a number of them. More 
of the other paper than of news print, as a matter of fact. 
Mr. Wise. In the recent past you have had occasion to make. 
a special examination into the accounts of the companies involved 
in this particular proceeding, have you not? 
Mr. May. Yes, we are doing that now. 
Mr. Wise. And as a result of your studies in the whole field 
of accountancy and of your particular studies of the companies 
involved here, have you formed any opinion as to what is a proper 
rate of return upon the investment? 
Mr. May. Well, to state what is a fair rate of return today is a 
little difficult question, and the immediate effect of war condi-
tions is rather difficult to estimate accurately. Of course, the 
answer depends, in some measure, on how you value your prop-
erty. If you in valuing your property take the highest point of 
the present costs you do not have to give the same liberality in 
return as you have if you take a lower level as the basis of value. 
Naturally the two are always linked up together, but I would say, 
based on pre-war conditions, a prospect of a return of 15 to 20 
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per cent. has always been necessary to attract capital into a busi-
ness of moderate hazards. This, I would say, would certainly 
not be more than covered by those rates. 
I think that property has to earn that in order to attract capital 
into the business. In saying that, I am basing it largely on my 
actual experience of cases where even that return has failed to 
attract purchasers. You would be surprised if you had seen as 
many cases as I have where earnings which showed approximately 
15 per cent. had been turned down by people contemplating buy-
ing. I was surprised myself, because I approached it purely from 
the professional standpoint, earlier in my experience. I have seen 
so many now that I am convinced of the fact that that is so, and 
in recent years I have given a good deal of thought to the reasons. 
I imagine Mr. Wise will want me to state some of the reasons 
I have for saying it, entirely from the practical standpoint of 
experience. 
Commissioner Murdock. Let me follow that. Supposing I came 
to you and said, "Mr. May, I wish you would go out here to 
Podunk, Indiana, and look over a mill out there I want to buy." 
You go and look over the mill and come back and report to me 
and say, "They have got $100,000 in that mill supported by 
$10,000 earnings, but my advice is not to buy it." 
Mr. May. I would say that, but I do not base so much on my 
advice as on the number of cases where I reported to people and 
they refused to buy. 
Within the last sixty days I had a business in New York that 
was earning $100,000 a year which had between $600,000 and 
$700,000 of assets. Those people could not get a buyer for the 
property. Finally it was sold for $500,000. That is an actual 
case within the last sixty days. People who have not been 
through it do not realize it. That is why I have been concerning 
myself with trying to explain the phenomenon. 
Commissioner Fort. Do you not consider that now that con-
dition may be worse largely on account of the war ? 
Mr. May. As a matter of fact that particular plant had more 
opportunities during the war. During the war it will earn a 
great deal more than in normal conditions. 
Commissioner Fort. You do not think conditions as to the 
uncertainty of business, owing to the war, had anything to do 
with it ? 
Mr. May. No, I do not think so. 
Commissioner Murdock. As a matter of fact, the answer you 
would return to me in that case, Mr. May, would be this: If the 
facts were verified, showing it is a sure thing that there is 
$100,000 in that mill I have looked over, and I found this is the 
maximum earning for several years, but there seems to be an 
upward tendency in the mill and I think it is going to earn more 
in a few years. That is about the way you would report to me. 
In other words, in surveying the property for me you would 
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not take merely the present into your consideration, but you 
would take a survey of the past and just as near as you could 
form a survey of the future as you were able to in your report 
to me. 
Mr. May. Of course, if I could put my finger on anything that 
was only earning 10 per cent. and I felt satisfied that it would 
earn 25 per cent. I would say, go ahead and buy it, but, of course, 
that is a rather different question from the proposition of fixing 
a maximum rate of return you are going to allow them to earn 
in the future. 
Commissioner Murdock. I wanted to get it just as simply as 
possible. 
Mr. May. The more questions you ask the better I will be 
pleased, because I do not want to leave any point that is not clear 
in your mind, if I can help it. 
Mr. Wise. You say that 15 per cent. return is needed to at-
tract capital into an industry of moderate hazards. What would 
you say of the paper industry? Does that come into the class of 
industrials where the hazards are moderate? 
Mr. May. I would say it was an industry of moderate hazards 
although not one of the lowest of that group. 
Mr. Wise. What would you regard as the hazards of the busi-
ness ? 
Mr. May. Well, first of all, the uninsurable risks, and the 
second, which I think has regard to a large part of the industry, 
is the fact that it is engaged in a business in one country and 
selling its product largely in another country, and is, therefore, 
subject to the operation of the fiscal policy of the two different 
countries and to the elements of government control by two dif-
ferent governments whose interests may not always be identical; 
that is a distinct hazard in the business. 
Then there is another equally important hazard in it, and that 
is the fact that it takes such a large return in proportion to the 
sales. If you have a business with sales of four or five times the 
capital you can always provide the return on capital by a reason-
able percentage of the sales, and nobody would say this is an 
exorbitant return on your investment, but when you have to get 
a large percentage on your sales, people are always apt to say, 
"Why, half the selling price is profit, or 25 per cent. is profit; 
that must be too much." Whereas it is not at all necessarily so 
in an industry like this where the capital is large in proportion 
to the sales, and 20 per cent. or 25 per cent. profit on sales would 
not be anything like as remunerative as 2 or 3 per cent. profit is 
to John Wanamaker, Sears Roebuck, or Woolworth, or any of 
those people. Therefore, I always feel where they have to have 
a large investment in proportion to the sales it detracts from the 
attractiveness of the investment. 
Mr. Wise. Well, what is the basis of your calculation for your 
return? 
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Mr. May. The investment value of the property. I noticed 
Mr. Erickson discusses the question to some extent from the 
standpoint of bonds and stocks, and, therefore, I would like to 
say that in my view of the case the controlling factor is the in-
vestment value, that is, the total present value of the investment, 
and the question whether capitalized by bonds or stocks does not 
enter into it in my view of the case at all. 
Mr. Wise. Does it make any difference to you how many times 
the turnover in that business occurs in a year? 
Mr. May. How do you mean ? 
Mr. Wise. Sales? 
Mr. May. I think it does, in this way. The return must be 
based on the investment, but if the turnover is small, as I said, 
your percentage of profit to sales looks so high that there is always 
a tendency to cut it unduly; that is your hazard. 
Mr. Wise. Are you speaking with the idea of only one turn-
over of capital per annum in a business ? 
Mr. May. In this business I suppose you do not turn over your 
capital once a year. Comparing the agricultural implement in-
dustry and the packing industry it is much more difficult for the 
agricultural implement industry to get a fair return on capital 
than the packers because the same rate of return would consti-
tute something like eight or nine times the percentage of sales 
in the case of the agricultural implement industry that it would 
in the case of the packers. 
Commissioner Murdoch. Mr. May is speaking of the gross 
sales as contrasted with the capital. He is talking about the 
turnover. 
Mr. May. Yes, the turnover. The turnover is the relation of 
sales to capital investment. 
Commissioner Murdock. That is, the more rapid the turnover, 
the lower the rate of profit on the investment. 
Mr. May. No, I do not say that. I say that theoretically they 
should be the same, but practically, because a given profit is a 
higher percentage of sales, you have more difficulty in getting it. 
That is one of the hazards of the business. That is the point I 
was trying to make. 
Commissioner Fort. Well then, in your idea, the profit should 
be the same on every sale of a concern that has but one turnover 
per annum as the concern that has five turnovers per annum. 
Mr. May. Percentage of investment. 
Commisioner Fort. That may make quite a difference. 
Mr. May. Of course the percentage of investment should be 
the same, although the percentage of sales would be much higher 
in the case of the company with a small turnover than the one 
with a big turnover. 
Mr. Wise. Can you explain that any further: 
Mr. May. No, I think that is all. 
Mr. Wise. Now you stated, Mr. May, that as a basis of the 
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return you take the investment regardless of how that investment 
is placed, whether it is in stocks, in bonds, or part in stocks and 
part in bonds? 
Mr. May. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Wise. In other words, it is no matter whether one com-
pany has a $50,000,000 and another a $5,000,000 outlay they are 
entitled to the same rate of return? 
Mr. May. That is my feeling. 
Mr. Wise. I wish you would go right ahead and explain your 
position here without my having to prompt you or question you 
at all, and testify as to your opinion for a rate of return on the 
basis that you have recited. 
Mr. May. All right. I hope you will interrupt whenever you 
see fit. 
In the first place, before I start to discuss reasons for the 
opinion I want to emphasize two points, first, that I take it what 
we are discussing is a maximum price and that there is no 
guarantee you are going to get that price, and that there is no 
guarantee of a minimum price. I think that is a fairly agreed 
upon point. In the second place, I want to emphasize the dis-
tinction between the profits that a business must earn and the 
profits which can be distributed to the investors in that business. 
A large part of the earnings of every successful company has 
to be reinvested in that business, or, as Mr. Schwab put it once, 
a dollar for dividends and a dollar for plant, and it is curious 
how nearly accurate that is. 
In preparing a brief for the Senate Finance Committee on the 
excess profits tax payment dealing with that point, I took at ran-
dom forty companies, railroads, public utilities and manufacturing 
companies and miscellaneous companies, and when we checked 
all the figures back that were drawn at random it showed over 
a five-year period they would actually distribute in dividends 
almost exactly 50 per cent., within 1 per cent. of 50 per cent. 
of the total earnings in the five years. So if you happen to earn 
your 15 per cent. or 20 per cent. you won't be able to distribute 
year in and year out more than half of it. That is the first point.. 
Commissioner Murdoch. Mr. May, I do not quite get that in 
my mind. What I would like to know is what you are feeding 
that 10 per cent. to. If you allow 20 per cent. to go in the busi-
ness and give 10 per cent. to the stockholders, where does that 
other 10 per cent. go ? 
Mr. May. It goes to build up the business. Of course, it ulti-
mately accrues directly or indirectly to the benefit of the stock-
holder. There is no doubt about that. As long as he gets only 
half distributed in cash he feels that the other half is going to 
build up the business. It may or may not. Some do get it. 
Commissioner Murdoch. The ordinary method, as I have ob-
served it, is to divert that 10 per cent. which is not distributed 
as dividends into some reserve fund or surplus. 
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Mr. May. Yes, that is so, but my experience is that a man is 
attracted if he thinks he has a fair prospect of being able to get 
that 15 or 20 per cent. out of the business, half in cash and half 
in equities piling up for the future. That is the way he sizes 
it up, as far as my experience goes. 
Commissioner Fort. That extra 10 per cent. is not distributed 
in dividends and you do not care whether it is carried in surplus 
or a sinking fund or put into new machinery as long as it is 
carried. 
Mr. May. Yes. 
Mr. Wise. It is a fact that it is never as such handed back to 
the stockholder. 
Mr. May. Yes, he has got to leave it in to insure he is still 
going to have a cash dividend in the future. 
Mr. Wise. He is simply switching his principal all the time 
to insure him of his return. 
Mr. May. That is right. I have made some examination of the 
actual facts. Take the Report of the Commissioner of Corpora-
tions on the investigation of the Steel Industry. You will find 
that year in and year out he said that the price of $28 for steel 
rails was the fixed price and that it never varied for years, or 
that there were very slight fluctuations. That yielded a profit 
of 18 per cent. on the investment to the steel corporation, in-
cluding 18 per cent. on the relative investment in ore properties 
and 18 per cent. on the relative investment in transportation 
facilities, taking ore properties, transportation, blast furnaces, 
mills, working capital, all along the line invested in turning out. 
a ton of steel rails, that the price of $28 yielded a return of 18 
per cent. on the entire capital, and yet, so far as my experience 
goes, nobody ever seriously questioned the fairness of the price 
of steel rails, and it remained unchanged for fifteen years, I 
suppose. 
Commissioner Murdoch. Of course, it has been traditional in 
the United States for thirty years that they sold cheaper abroad 
than at home. 
Mr. May. That, I think, is one of the things that has often 
been said but has never been proven. 
Then there is another report, taking the smaller companies. 
If you will refer to the Report of the Commissioner of Corpo-
rations on the investigation of Independent Tobacco Industry at 
the time it was being oppressed by the Tobacco Trust, as the 
report puts it. It shows for 48 independent companies— 
let me see, I have the exact figures here, I think—(referring to 
memorandum) an average profit of 15.9 per cent. and it is 
rather amazing to note that the Commissioner drew attention to 
that fact as evidence of oppression because the Tobacco Trust 
itself was earning 40 per cent. 
Then there was another interesting thing that developed in the 
same connection some three or four years ago. In the course of 
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a study of this question my firm took at random a series of records 
at our own offices. There were all kinds of businesses, largely 
small manufacturing companies, and we just took them as they 
came. We said to a man to go and pick out 200 reports, to take 
them straight out of the files, leaving out all public utilities and 
non-industrial concerns, pick them out and find out their capital, 
and we found the average of those 158 companies was 13.67 per 
cent. Those were accounts where we knew a proper provision 
had been made for salaries, depreciation and everything, so that 
we were dealing with reliable data, and they were just picked 
out at random. Those figures were published by one of my part-
ners in the American Economic Review, and I will put that in, 
if I may, because I have something further bearing on that. 
(The paper above referred to was received in evidence and 
marked Manufacturers' Exhibit No. 73, and is as follows:) 
MANUFACTURERS' EXHIBIT NO. 73 
THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 
VOL. VI MARCH, 1916 No. 1 
THE COMPARATIVE YIELD ON TRADE AND PUBLIC 
SERVICE INVESTMENT 
What constitutes a fair return upon capital invested in a busi-
ness enterprise ? Recent efforts of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission and of the various state public service commissions to 
regulate rates (or more truly to regulate profits) have made this 
a vital question. Broadly, the answer is given that such rate of 
return must be allowed as will attract capital in sufficient volume 
to develop and maintain the particular industry. As a statement 
of a ruling principle this is doubtless correct, but it is not a prac-
tical answer for, What is the fair rate of return that will attract 
capital to the industry? It does, however, suggest the funda-
mental truth that the investor has a right of selection and is, 
therefore, the final regulator; and, though for those who have 
already invested, the choice has been exercised, the effect of 
regulation on the potential future investor is a question of para-
mount importance to the public. 
The saving to the public which might result from reducing 
the limit of return on capital already invested in public utilities 
by, say, one or two per cent., considered by itself, is doubtless 
a notable sum, but it is insignificant if considered, as it should be, 
in relation to the value of attracting and inspiring with confidence 
the enormous further capital which requires yet to be invested 
in the extension of the facilities now established and the de-
velopment of new ones if this country is to attain its full develop-
ment and prosperity. So not only justice but self-interest dictates 
that the public should not restrict capital already invested to a 
rate of return too small to attract new capital. 
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Eventually, if rate regulation is applied consistently, experi-
ence will indicate with some measure of accuracy the rates that 
are adequate to attract capital to railroad and other public service 
securities. In the meantime, however, there is pretty sure to be 
much groping around with consequent damage to the public as 
well as to the investor. Evidence is not lacking that many in-
vestors are inclined, for the time being at least, to allow the 
regulating bodies to work out their experiments upon the other 
fellow, while they place their money either where it will be as 
nearly safe as may be, as in a savings bank or in high grade bonds, 
or invest it where it will yield a larger return than it is likely to 
yield if invested in enterprises subject to regulation. 
Thus the question really turns upon the competition for money. 
And money has its law of attraction, operating as certainly as 
the law of gravitation. Every investor is seeking safety and 
return. One may attach greater value to safety, while another 
desires, if possible, a larger return even though attended with a 
somewhat higher degree of risk, thus taking the speculative or 
gambling chances; and much skill is displayed in devising types 
of securities that will appeal to the different classes of investors. 
In the present uncertainty as to the maximum rate of return 
an investor in a public service corporation should be allowed to 
receive (and in passing it is important to note that it is nowhere 
proposed to guarantee even a minimum return), it would seem 
logical to inquire what return can be secured from investments in 
enterprises not subject to public regulation. Many attempts have 
been made in this direction with at best but incomplete or indif-
ferent success. It must be remembered that there is a tendency 
among regulating bodies to fix a rate of return to be allowed on 
the amount actually invested in the business and that, substan-
tially speaking, the intangible values, such as good-will, patents, 
etc., so frequently met with in industrial enterprises, and the 
so-called franchise and going concern values in public utility com-
panies are to be eliminated from the capital sum upon which a 
company subject to regulation may earn a return. The inclusion 
of these intangible values, which has been almost universal until 
quite recent years, by both utility and industrial companies under 
the general heading of property or other equivalent title in cor-
poration balance sheets, renders it impracticable to determine the 
rate of return upon the investment even in the case of corpora-
tions publishing reasonably full reports. Undoubtedly, the pres-
ent tendency in the case of new industrial companies is to set out 
as a separate balance sheet item the investment in good-will or 
other intangible assets, but the number of instances where this is 
done is as yet relatively small. It is, therefore, not possible to 
compile from the published reports of corporations statistics that 
would be upon a basis permitting accurate conclusions to be drawn 
therefrom. In so far as these statistics are accessible, whether 
found in the form of corporation annual report or of prospectus 
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issued in the flotation of securities, they show with remarkable 
uniformity a rate of return in excess of the maximum yet allowed 
in any representative case by any commission in determining 
rates. 
It is true even of our national banks, than which no line of 
business is perhaps rightfully regarded as more safe. The Comp-
troller of the Currency reports that the net earnings upon the 
capital and surplus of all the national banks averaged 8.64 per 
cent. for the forty-five years ending June 30, 1914. In only two 
of the last seven years of this period have the earnings ranged 
below this general average, and then but slightly, while the aver-
age for the seven years is 8.98 per cent. It will be observed that 
this rate of earnings is upon the surplus as well as upon the capi-
tal and if it is objected that bank surpluses are frequently under-
stated and that secret reserves commonly exist, it is sufficient to 
say in reply that in so far as this may be true, the profits must 
have been understated by an equal amount and therefore the. 
rate of earnings stated by the Comptroller of the Currency should, 
if anything, be increased. 
In an effort to supplement the meager data obtainable from 
published records, I have made a study of a number of audit 
reports prepared by my firm with a view to determining in each 
case, so far as could be done, the investment exclusive of in-
tangible assets of the character above mentioned, the return, and 
the resulting rate. The reports were selected purely at random 
from our files, excluding only those upon enterprises subject to 
regulation or otherwise outside the field of inquiry, such as re-
ports upon governmental bodies, charitable institutions and the 
like. It was necessary to discard a considerable proportion of 
the reports selected for examination principally because of their 
failure to disclose the measure of the intangible values included 
among the assets. This process of elimination, however, left 
158 reports showing the amount of the investment and the profits, 
after payment of operating and management expenses, earned 
by enterprises engaged in a wide range of business activities and 
scattered throughout the United States. The contents of indi-
vidual reports and the identity of the clients must, of course, be 
withheld, but certain group generalizations can be made without 
violation of professional confidence; and I trust they will throw 
some light upon the return earned by capital invested in lines of 
business open to competition but not subject to governmental 
regulation of rates or earnings. 
It may be objected that an accountant's reports are likely to 
be confined to the more prosperous concerns and will not for 
this reason give a fair indication of general conditions. The 
premise here is correct only in part. Every important account-
ing firm is brought into contact, sometimes in bankruptcies and 
receiverships, sometimes through disputes between owners, some-
times to determine the efficiency of a management or to locate the 
12 
reason for a falling off of earnings, with enterprises that are 
unprofitable. Even were the charge wholly true it would be 
relatively unimportant, inasmuch as the regulation of rates is 
merely an effort to limit the maximum earnings and does not 
concern itself with the failure of a given utility to earn that 
maximum. 
The aggregate investment represented by the 158 audit reports 
was $406,829,358. This relatively small total for so large a 
group is attributable to the fact that reports upon the accounts 
of most of the very large concerns had to be set aside for reasons 
indicated above. The annual profits remaining for the enjoyment 
of this capital, after providing for all costs and expenses of 
operation and management, including depreciation of plant and 
equipment, were $55,613,659 or 13.67 per cent. The periods 
covered by these reports are not uniform, but in most instances 
the accounts are for the calendar years 1912 and 1913 or for 
fiscal years ending in 1913 or 1914, while in a few instances the 
period covered is a fiscal year ending in 1912. During this time 
business conditions have been generally unfavorable and some 
lines of trade have suffered considerable depression. It may, 
therefore, be assumed that the profits earned during the past 
two or three years have been not more than a fair average; fur-
thermore, as the present study is confined to audited accounts, 
the results may be expected to be more accurate than statistics 
usually are. 
A few of the concerns under review show an actual loss on 
their operations. Only four, however, fail to earn any part of 
their interest charges, and these have a total investment of only 
$1,527,914 and show an operating loss of $26,993. Nineteen 
more having an investment of $60,358,131 earned less than 6 
per cent. and fourteen of these businesses earned less than 5 per 
cent. Of the entire group of enterprises, therefore, twenty-three, 
or 14½ per cent. in number, earned less than the usual legal 
rate of interest after paying the costs of operation and manage-
ment. 
A further analysis of the 158 reports under examination shows 
that upon the invested capital: 
There appears to be a widespread belief that large corporations 
have crowded the small business man, if not to the wall, at least 
to the point where he finds increasing difficulty in making an 
13 
In 117 cases 8 per cent. or more was earned 
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adequate profit. Many intelligent persons sincerely believe this 
to be true and are deeply disturbed thereby. It is interesting 
and perhaps not without significance to find from the reports now 
being considered that fifty-nine of them relate to enterprises each 
having an investment of $1,000,000 or more and having an ag-
gregate investment of $379,511,380 upon which the earnings 
amounted to $51,317,952 or 13.52 per cent. Only one of these 
concerns failed to earn any profits, and its loss for the year was 
only a fraction over 1 per cent. upon the investment of $1,200,000, 
so that its bearing upon the general average is unimportant. 
Twenty-five reports relate to businesses having an investment of 
$100,000 or less and may, therefore, be taken as indicating so far 
as they may go the situation of the so-called small business man. 
The total investment in these twenty-five cases was $1,156,827, 
while the profits are found to be no less than $324,114 or 28.02 
per cent. Another compilation shows that the average return 
upon the investments of $500,000 or less was 16.67 per cent. 
The smallest investment shown by any of the reports is that of 
a retail store employing a capital of $9,250, upon which for the 
year 1913 it earned 34.27 per cent. The highest rate of return 
in the group is found in a little establishment having an invest-
ment of $13,000, while the second in rank employed slightly less 
than $51,000. Of the ten instances mentioned above as having 
earned over 40 per cent. each, five had an investment of less than 
$60,000 and all but two were below $200,000. 
In determining the profits of a small business, the question of 
management salaries is relatively more important than in a large 
one and the thought may arise that a sufficient allowance for this 
expense might perhaps reduce largely the profits shown for the 
smaller enterprises. To this suggestion, two replies may be 
made; first, that a careful effort was made to exclude reports 
upon accounts which did not make reasonable provision for man-
agement salaries; and, second, that since 1909, when the corpo-
ration tax law was enacted, the tendency among the smaller cor-
porations, where the officers are usually the principal stockholders, 
has been toward a liberal allowance for salaries and a consequent 
reduction of taxable profits. It is not necessary to imply, nor do 
I so imply, that by the use of this means there has been any 
extensive evasion of taxation; but the corporation tax law per-
mitted a deduction to be made for management salaries and it 
has not been customary for corporations either to fail to claim 
the deduction or in fixing the amount to err on the low side. 
In so far, therefore, as the statistics before us indicate, it is 
very clear that the day of the small business is not yet past. The 
initiative and enterprise of the man of moderate means still bring, 
as they deserve to bring, a reward far beyond anything that may 
reasonably be hoped for by the employers of great aggregations 
of capital. The figures given for the profits of small enterprises 
may seem surprising to many. If this is so it will be largely be-
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cause public impressions are based upon profits divided rather 
than upon profits earned. In most growing businesses the dif-
ference is substantial, as it is seldom desirable or practicable to 
distribute the whole of the profits. 
Incidentally, it may be pertinent to suggest that the ideal type 
of regulation should provide not only rates for the distribution 
of profits, but for rates of service that while not unduly burden-
some upon the payers should not be reduced except where they 
provide a substantial excess over: 
(a) a fair distribution of profits to the owners; 
(b) a substantial sum for the betterment and surplus to be held 
subject to definite restrictions and to be deducted from 
the capital sum in any future calculation of return. 
It should be borne in mind that the theory of governmental 
regulation is based largely upon the assumption that public ser-
vice corporations, from their very nature, are or should be mo-
nopolies, or, at least, not subject to the same competition, quan-
titatively or qualitatively, as other enterprises; in other words, 
that regulation is, to a large extent, a substitute for competition 
as the prime factor in the attainment of reasonable rates. And 
yet, as indicated below, commissions have been exceedingly loath 
to grant to public service corporations a return comparable to 
that being earned by unregulated enterprises, even where the 
latter are exposed to intense and active competition. 
Contrasted with the profits earned by businesses not subject 
to regulation, the maximum return thus far allowed by the va-
rious state commissions, is, so far as I have been able to ascertain, 
only 8 per cent. That is the most the owners can hope for and 
in some cases a smaller maximum is fixed. Among the states 
in which decisions upon this question have been rendered by 
courts or commissions, reference may be made briefly as follows: 
Maximum return allowed by state commissions. 
(per cent.) 
Telephone and Gas and Street 
Telegraph Water Railway 
Illinois 8 
Kentucky 7 
Maryland 8 
California 8 
Iowa 8 
Washington 7 
Missouri 6 7 
New Jersey 8 8 
New York 8 7½ 
Nebraska 7 8 The United States Circuit Court held in the Northern Pacific 
case that 7 per cent. per annum was a fair return, while in the 
Arkansas rate case 6 per cent. with a possible 1½ per cent. ad-
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ditional in lean years was allowed. Both of these cases were 
decided in 1911. 
In every comparison of the rates or return, recognition must, 
of course, be given to the difference in the conditions affecting 
business generally and those under which public utilities are 
operated, with the consequent greater measure of confidence dis-
played by careful investors in favor of the securities of com-
panies in the latter field. At the same time it must be admitted 
that this margin of confidence in securities of utilities as against 
industrials is diminishing and the marked disparity of even less 
than ten years ago no longer exists. 
Having in view the earnings of capital in businesses outside the 
field of public regulation and the increasing stability of such en-
terprises, it does not seem too much to say that nothing is defi-
nitely settled by the decisions thus far rendered in rate cases. 
The commissions and the courts have been feeling their way 
among issues too often befogged and possibly with eyes too 
constantly fixed upon interest rates and dividends and without 
giving sufficient consideration to the speculative element of profit 
that has made possible the rapid development of electrical and 
other utilities in recent years. It is the desire of every one that 
this process of development shall continue unabated. It cannot 
continue if capital finds greater attraction elsewhere. Not the 
only attraction but certainly one of the most important is the 
rate of profit capital may reasonably expect to earn under com-
petent enterprising management. 
It is my hope that the facts herein given, culled as they have 
been from a group of business enterprises at once too small to 
justify the drawing of final conclusions and yet a group much 
more extensive in variety of activity and in territory than, per-
haps, has heretofore been subjected to a similar study in equal 
accuracy of detail, may prove suggestive; and, what is much 
more important, I trust what has been said may serve to incite 
a more comprehensive investigation of those business facts ordi-
narily stated in terms of profit and loss. 
J. E. STERRETT. 
Commissioner Murdock. That is 6½ per cent. to the stock-
holders and 6½ per cent. to the business ? 
Mr. May. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Wise. Some of the companies made less than 6 per cent. 
altogether and others made as much as 24 per cent? 
Mr. May. Some of them made a loss as the actual facts show. 
Out of the 158 cases there were 70 that earned over 15 per cent. 
Now these companies, as stated, were selected in 1913; they were 
not picked out but just taken at random in 1913. I thought that 
for this purpose it would be interesting to take as many of those 
same companies as I could find and find out what their last report 
showed. I was able to find in our office files the corresponding 
records for 86 of those 158 companies. 
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Commissioner Murdock. As of what year? 
Mr. May. The year ending 1916 or 1917. Those 86 companies 
in the earlier period averaged 13.11 per cent., and the same 
companies in the later period averaged 20.37 per cent. I also 
have the percentage here of the individual companies showing 
the different ranges in the earlier period. There were 16 earn-
ing between 15 and 20 per cent. and 24 earning over 20 per 
cent. There are 40 earning over 15 per cent. today and there 
are 7 earning between 15 and 20 per cent., and 39 earning over 
20, making 46 out of 86 that are earning from 15 per cent., 
and about 60 per cent. of those companies, between 50 and 60, 
are companies with a capital investment of under a million dol-
lars. They are not big trusts, they are small and medium size 
corporations. 
This is another light on the question, and 1 have prepared some 
figures which seem to me particularly illuminating in view of the 
fact many of the parties to this proceeding are Canadian cor-
porations. Now, Canada's normal source of supply of capital is 
Great Britain, and, therefore, it seems to me that figures show-
ing the return in industry in Great Britain, and in countries 
capitalized in Great Britain, would be relevant. The London 
Economist, which is the best known of the financial journals of 
London, gives each year a summary of the profits shown by 
corporations whose accounts are published in its columns during 
that year. I have prepared the figures from those summaries, 
by industries, leaving out the railways, public utilities, mines and 
financial companies like banks and trust companies. I have had 
them prepared under different groups and I have worked them 
out to show the percentage of profit to the total capital, whether 
borrowed capital or stock capital, during these years. The aver-
ages are as follows: the ending of the year June 30, 1914; the 
average of all companies is 11.25 per cent.; 1915, 10.32 per cent. 
That is where they felt the adverse effect of the beginning of the 
war: 1916, 12.65 per cent.; 1917, 13.27 per cent. 
(The paper above referred to was received in evidence and 
marked Manufacturers' Exhibit No. 74, consisting of four tabu-
lations, and is as follows:) 
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Mr. Wise. How many companies does that represent? 
Mr. May. It represents about 650 companies with a total in-
vested capital of about 550,000,000 pounds sterling. 
Mr. Wise. Good, bad and indifferent? 
Mr. May. All that are published. I will draw attention to the 
breweries, which come at the top. English breweries are no-
toriously overcapitalized. They were a very, very successful 
industry. They were capitalized on the basis of their earning 
capacity during their palmy days. Undoubtedly they are over-
capitalized. If you leave out the breweries in any year it raises 
the average of the rest about one per cent. In my view they are 
extremely interesting and I think relevant as regards this pro-
ceeding. 
Commissioner Murdoch. That is on the aggregate of these 
industries, less the breweries, the rate would be for the year 1917, 
14.37? 
Mr. May. About that. 14.37, if you leave the breweries out. 
Breweries only earned 6.7. 
Then there is another significant figure, that is, the earnings 
of our national banks. The reports of the Comptroller of the 
Currency show that the earnings of national banks in the last 
fifteen or sixteen years—it does not make much difference what 
period you take—they averaged 9.7 per cent. on the total capital 
and surplus invested. Now there is a really attractive industry, 
the national bank. Your capital is in there and you can take it out 
and liquidate it if you do not like that kind of investment. It is 
entirely different from locking up property in bricks and mortar. 
They are not any good unless they be put to some such use as 
you build them for. That has always seemed to me a very good 
index and it seems to me is entirely in line with the general con-
clusion that you reach from studying the industrial businesses 
because there cannot be any question as to the attractiveness of 
a national bank investment. 
Commissioner Fort. Except in one respect, double liability on 
stock. 
Mr. May. That is true. 
Mr. Wise. What is the percentage of loss in that case? 
Mr. May. I think that is the key to the explanation of the con-
dition that I have been discussing, and what is the actual reason 
for that is significant. The actual losses are less than five-
hundredths of one per cent. Yet one of the first things a man 
thinks of when he thinks of a national bank investment is the 
liability of it and the risks he is running and that influences his 
judgment as to the attractiveness of that investment far beyond 
the mathematical value of the risk, and that is the clue, I think. 
That is the clue to the whole thing. 
Take fire insurance. Every man is considered lacking in all 
business prudence if he does not insure, yet he is paying double 
the mathematical value of the risk for the insurance. Not more 
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than 50 per cent. of the premiums paid go to pay losses. I hap-
pened to be talking last week to a Mr. Graham Harding, who is an 
assessor for Lloyds in London. His firm have acted for Lloyds 
for 120 years and he was talking about this business that Lloyds 
do in insuring all sorts of extraordinary risks, and he said, of 
course, they make some spectacular losses, to be sure, but they 
are making all the time spectacular profits—because people are 
willing to pay many times the mathematical value of the risk. 
I think that is the one factor more than any other that ac-
counts for the high rate of return that you have got to give to 
attract capital into industry. I do not know of any single factor 
that is more potent. Now, of course, there is a suggestion that 
grows out of that, namely, that by our system of distributing 
securities you can spread your risks and therefore you do not 
sustain those losses. In our country there are two ways of finan-
cing industry, practically. One or two men or a group of men 
go in and put up all the capital and control the business or else 
it is distributed to the public. Now if a few men put it in they 
are the men who control it and if they go in the way they look 
at it is somewhat like this: Well, we have looked to make a 
certain profit and if we make more than that profit it will give 
us a little more income, but as we come up the value of the 
income is relatively less. If you have an income of $25,000 a 
year and increase it to $30,000, you have added $5,000, but you 
have not added 20 per cent. to the enjoyments you get out of 
life. It is just the same as building a steamer. When you get 
up to a 20-knot steamer it costs a lot more money to add a little 
speed. The higher you get the less in the way of additional 
speed you get for your money. That is the way we live, the more 
income you get the less you really get out of it for the additional 
income. On the other hand, if they should lose the whole thing, 
that is a loss that is far more felt than any small addition to 
their income, if successful. Therefore, only a prospect of get-
ting a liberal return attracts them. On the other hand, if you 
are trying to distribute to small holders you come up against 
another factor, that is, the factor in the high cost of everything 
in this country, the high cost of distribution and the high profits 
of distributors, and that applies to securities and the selling of 
securities. In other words, it applies to the raising of money 
just the same as it does to the problem of distribution of com-
modities. There is the same difference between the prices that 
the farmer gets and the price that the consumer pays and 
between the cost of money to the industry and the return on the 
investment to the ultimate distributees of those securities. The 
discrepancy is almost as large in one case as in the other. And, 
of course, you have got to make things reasonably attractive to 
the individual small holder. In his case his risk is not quite as 
large. But there is another factor that operates far more with 
him than it does with the big investor. When a few men take 
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hold of a business they do not worry much about the hazards of 
bad management. They are generally willing to admit that they 
can give good management, but the small investor has to take the 
risk of bad management as well as risks inherent in the business. 
He sees the possibility of loss from bad management. So that 
in the long run it does not make very much difference which way 
you go about getting capital into the industry because to make it 
attractive, you must give just about the same return in the one-
case as the other. 
Commissioner Murdock. There must be some point, however,, 
in your reasoning upon this proposition at which you come to 
the conclusion that the rate of return is unreasonably high. Where 
does that point arise in your mind ? 
Mr. May. When you say rate of return unreasonably high, 
that is a somewhat difficult question to answer in connection with 
competitive business. My thought is that regulation and pro-
tection ought to go hand in hand. If you do not give any pro-
tection you are not in a position to insist on regulation. If you 
give a minimum of protection you cannot insist on a maximum 
of regulation. If you fix a minimum return you can fix a maxi-
mum return. If you do not give any sort of protection at all 
it is rather difficult for me to see on what you may base any 
regulation of return other than a paramount public interest or 
something of that kind, of course. All I can see is that in so far 
as a regulative body can control the situation they would not do 
anything that was calculated to promote extravagantly high re-
turns, and in the interest of the consumer, ultimately, just as 
much as of the producer, you have got to fix that fairly high if 
you are going to make it a maximum. Commissions may be the 
primary regulators but capital is the ultimate regulator because 
the necessity of attracting capital into enterprise and keeping 
capital in enterprise is, after all, the paramount consideration, 
and that, I think, is particularly true when you are dealing with 
an industry that is largely outside of your own jurisdiction, as 
you are in this case. You cannot compel capital to stay in news 
print in Canada by any proceeding in this case if you fix the 
return so low as to discourage them from staying in it. 
Mr. Wise. You can compel them to stay in the United States ? 
Mr. May. By a gradual extension of the powers of the Gov-
ernment which might make the return in all industries unattrac-
tive. I mean by that that they would rather stay in the frying 
pan than jump into the fire. 
Commissioner Fort. There is another situation there. You say 
the voluntary bringing of them into another jurisdiction. They 
may of necessity, if they wish to carry on their business, be com-
pelled to bring them into another jurisdiction because they have 
not enough demand at home. 
Mr. May. If you drive him out of the industry, he can go 
out of the industry and, of course, a lot of these water power 
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companies could turn their service to other uses. They may 
have to come in here if they want to stay in the news print 
business. If they come into the United States and it should 
regulate the return in the industry they would be no better off. 
If they should go out of the industry they would go into some-
thing else in Canada. 
Commissioner Fort. And make a profit ? 
Mr. May. Yes. 
Mr. Wise. What I wanted to ask was this. Commissioner 
Murdock spoke of the return becoming too high. That is not a 
condition that can arise in a competitive field, is it, unless the 
competition is wiped out by combination ? 
It is a fair proposition that supply and demand is going to 
keep down any such abnormal conditions ? 
Commissioner Murdock. That law of supply and demand is 
occasionally repealed. 
Mr. May. If I were a purchaser I would rather take my chance 
on having a fairly high maximum and relying on competition 
to keep prices down than I would run the risk of a low maxi-
mum and a consequent discouragement of capital from coming 
into the enterprise. I would rather take my chance on the first. 
Commissioner Murdock. Would you stimulate production by 
high prices ? 
Mr. May. I should. 
Commissioner Murdock. Then after you got a stimulated pro-
duction how would you maintain your high prices ? 
Mr. May. You do not stimulate production by fixing high 
prices because you do not fix a price. All I would say is you can 
avoid discouraging production while preventing prices from go-
ing up to a point where they would be prohibitive. 
Of course, the excess profits tax and the business profits tax 
in Canada operate to a considerable extent as levelers, and I do 
not know but what they level down in a way that is more equit-
able to the community as a whole than the regulation of prices. 
The point of view there, in the case of companies that make high 
profits, is that it comes to the whole community rather than to 
one group of consumers. I do not think it is any detriment to 
the consumers. I think it is to the interest of the consumers and 
the government in these times. 
Mr. Wise. When the Government itself is in the market 
buying? 
Mr. May. No, I do not mean that. 
Mr. Wise. That is quite another proposition. 
Mr. May. Yes, that is quite another proposition. 
Mr. Wise. When the Government itself is buying an article 
and you put the price up high in order to get the tax back the 
consumer pays and not the Government. There is not much 
profit in that. 
Mr. May. Within reasonable limits I believe it is a good policy 
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of the Government for the psychological effect. However, that 
is a different proposition. The producer's handling the money 
adds a little encouragement. 
Mr. Wise. He thinks he has it until the tax collector comes 
around. 
Mr. May, have you given any consideration to the question of 
this price or this profit being applied, say, on the whole industry 
or on a part of the industry ? 
Mr. May. Well, that is, of course, one of the crucial problems; 
that is a very critical problem and it depends on a lot of factors 
which are particularly numerous just now, with the question of 
the curtailment of non-essential industries, which is very much in 
the air. The question of production is a factor there, but I would 
approach it from the standpoint of a return of between 15 and 
20 per cent. to anybody who is within 80 per cent. of the produc-
tion necessary to fill the demand. That is the way I would look 
at that question, but it is a fairly big question and involves so 
many considerations. 
Commissioner Fort. Would you consider an allowance of 5 
per cent. profit on an industry with two turnovers a year a fair 
profit ? 
Mr. May. No, I do not. Nothing but compulsion or patriot-
ism, I think, would keep capital in that industry very long on that 
basis. 
Mr. Wise. Have you given any particular thought in your 
work on the question of whether or not in figuring the investment 
there should be any item included for what is known as the 
going value? 
Mr. May. Going value or good will ? 
Mr. Wise. I distinguish between good will and going value. 
Mr. May. All right. 
Mr. Wise. In fixing a price do you think that the good will of 
a business is to be considered ? 
Mr. May. Good will, as I see it, rests primarily on earning 
capacity. In determining what the earning capacity shall be you 
cannot predicate your action on the capital value of that earning 
capacity. I do not think good will enters into it at all. As to 
going value in the sense of the value of the developed industry 
as compared with the position of an industry that is just com-
pleted—a plant that is nothing more than a plant I think, within 
reasonable limits—that should be recognized as part of the in-
vestment on which a return should be figured, and in this par-
ticular case I do not imagine the publishers would dissent from 
that view. I recognize that the new excess profits tax law is one 
of the greatest hardships that these publishers are suffering from. 
Their going value is a great part of their value and the unfortu-
nate terms of the excess profits tax are undoubtedly a very serious 
hardship to the publishers, 
Mr. Wise. Do you mean if they have included in their state-
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ment good will, that when they come to make up their excess 
profits taxes it has to be included? 
Mr. May. There is no recognition that the established value of 
a newspaper is invested capital under the excess profits tax law. 
Mr. Wise. That is not good will. Take a newspaper subscrip-
tion ; it is not good will. 
Commissioner Murdock. It is not. (Laughter.) 
Mr. Wise. Not all. 
Mr. May. I am sorry to say it is, for the purposes of the ex-
cess profits tax. 
Mr. Wise. But they have spent money in building up, have they 
not ? 
Mr. May. Yes. 
Mr. Wise. It represents an actual outlay? 
Mr. May. I believe the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
feels— 
Mr. Plante. Has the Commissioner actually made a ruling on 
that? 
Mr. May. I think what they are trying to do— 
Mr. Plante. Has he made a ruling? 
Mr. May. There is no official ruling on it as yet. 
Mr. Plante. Why tell us about what somebody is threatening 
to do? 
Commissioner Fort. It does not affect this case. 
Mr. May. I apologize if I have gone off the subject. 
Commissioner Murdock. Mr. May, what is your definition of 
going value? 
Mr. May. I think, as far as going value should be recognized 
in a case of this kind, it would simply represent the reasonable 
cost or additional value resulting from the act of building up the 
plant from the point where the plant is completed to the point 
where it has a successful business going. It is a difficult thing to 
measure, I admit. In an industry where there is a big investment 
like this, of course there is the actual expense and loss of return 
during the preliminary period immediately following the com-
pletion of the plant. That is the best criterion of it that I think 
suggests itself. 
Mr. Wise. Do you consider it to be a proper form of account-
ing for a manufacturer, in an industry such as this, to set up a 
charge for depreciation? 
Mr. May. Why, yes. 
Mr. Wise. How long has it been the custom with accountants 
in this country? 
Mr. May. Well, it is a development. It is pretty hard to say. 
I know, in the early days of my experience here I lost a great 
deal of work because I refused to sign accounts as being correct 
unless they had provided for depreciation. But it is a develop-
ment, more or less general, I should say, during the last ten or 
twelve years. I would say that the Federal Trade Commission 
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itself has assisted the accountants a great deal in spreading the 
recognition of it, although, to be perfectly honest, I think per-
haps the income tax has done even more to stimulate the practice. 
Commissioner Murdoch. It is growing all the time ? 
Mr. May. As the tax rate grows, you can rely on its growing. 
Commissioner Fort. I did not suppose there was any question 
about setting up depreciation. 
Mr. May. No; I do not think there is. 
Commissioner Fort. Nor is there any question either, in good 
bookkeeping, as to setting up depletion— 
Mr. May. No. 
Commissioner Fort. (Continuing:) Where at the end of a 
specified period of time the industry may be depleted so that there 
is not any. Now, is there any other way to provide for the car-
rying of the repayment of the 10 per cent. to the stockholders, 
if you keep on paying dividends? 
Mr. May. That is the point. 
Commissioner Fort. Take the coal industry. Here is a coal 
field, say ten acres square. There is a vein running through it. 
The coal company is incorporated for a hundred thousand dol-
lars. I make that figure because it is small. The' stockholders 
put their hundred thousand dollars in there, and at the end of a 
period of twenty years you have exhausted your coal, and you 
have paid out your money in dividends, and by methods of 
various kinds, taking care of your machinery, and so forth, and 
when you get through your machinery is practically junk. Now, 
what are you going to pay your capital stock on, if you do not 
provide for depletion? 
Mr. May. If you pay out all your current earnings, you are 
not, strictly speaking, paying dividends; you are paying out of 
capital, and it ought to be recognized as such. 
Commissioner Fort. Then you would not get any interest on 
your capital. 
Mr. May. You should get a fair return plus depletion. 
Commissioner Fort. Six per cent. does not take care of your 
principal ? 
Mr. May. Oh, no. 
Commissioner Fort. If you get six per cent., and at the end 
of a period of twenty years your coal vein is exhausted, how are 
you going to pay your stockholders back their money ? 
Mr. May. Charge it into the cost, and set aside a fund for de-
pletion. 
Commissioner Fort. Depletion; yes. 
Mr. Wise. And they have not all done that ? 
Mr. May. No. 
Commissioner Fort. The result of the investigations we made 
here as to the coal industry was that 60 per cent. of the coal 
mines of the United States charge neither depreciation nor de-
pletion. 
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Mr. May. 1 can believe that is true. 
Mr. Plante. They cannot eat the cake and have it, too. 
Commissioner Fort. There is a larger percentage on depletion, 
but I take the average as to both. 
Mr. May. There is one other point that I wanted to bring out, 
that I overlooked; that is when we were talking about the ques-
tion of the capitalization not affecting the amount of return. In 
view of what Mr. Erickson said, there is one consideration that 
I would like to point out. That is the effect of the excess profits 
tax on that question. I am not discussing the question of allowing 
that excess profits tax in figuring a return, but I want to point 
out that the excess profits tax, which I think we must take to be 
a part of our fiscal system for a good many years to come, makes 
financing through bonds extremely expensive and almost imprac-
ticable. Suppose you had a company that had $1,000,000 invest-
ment, and was earning 20 per cent, on the whole thing, that is, 
$200,000. It had borrowed half that money at seven per cent. 
in interest and discount. Now, its excess profits tax on that basis 
would be $40,000, whereas if it were capitalized wholly by stock 
its excess profits tax would be only $26,500. Therefore, the ad-
ditional excess profits tax resulting from capitalizing with bonds 
is 40 per cent. of the interest on the bonds; and whatever may 
have been the fact in the past, all the considerations based on the 
possibility of capitalizing with bonds as to the future have to be 
very substantially modified on that account. If the United States 
Steel Corporation today could retire a hundred millions of its 
bonds by an issue of stock, it would reduce its excess profits tax 
by $11,000,000. 
Commissioner Murdoch. They do not know that over in Wall 
Street yet, do they? (Laughter.) 
Mr. May. It is because both here and in Canada it has been 
the deliberate policy of the law to base the excess profits tax on 
the invested capital after deducting the borrowed capital. It was 
deliberately done. It was not done without argument. There 
were briefs innumerable submitted on the question, and it was a 
deliberate action of Congress here and it is the action of Parlia-
ment in Canada, and in Canada the effect is even more marked 
than I have cited here, because the Canadian tax is more steeply 
graduated. Here they go up from 25 to 35; there they go up 
25, 50 and 75; and I suppose if we stay in the war long enough 
we will get there too. So the whole policy of capitalizing with 
bonds has been fundamentally affected by the passage of that law. 
Commissioner Murdoch. That is likely to lead to a quite gen-
eral retirement of bonds, is it not? 
Mr. May. That is undoubtedly so. A number of our clients are 
retiring their bonds today, converting indebtedness in various 
forms into capital stock so as to get the benefit of the law. 
Mr. Wise. So your conclusion on that is that in computing the 
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return it should be on a flat rate upon the value of the invest-
ment, regardless of the investment? 
Mr. May. Yes. The character of the capitalization; yes. 
Mr. Wise. The capitalization. 
You may cross-examine. 
Mr. Plante. No cross-examination. 
(The witness was thereupon excused.) 
(Thereupon, at 4.30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned until 
Tuesday, March 26, 1918, at 2.30 o'clock p.m.) 
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